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THE CULTURE AND CONFLICT REVIEW 
Operation Nusrat (Victory): Understanding the Taliban Threat to Kunduz Province
Matthew C. DuPée[1], 11/1/2009 
“Although we had no such modern weapons, we have had one thing which is our faith; that real
Mujahidin will never be defeated. We have faith even if we do not have modern weaponries.”
– Taliban “Shadow” Governor for Kunduz, Mullah Abdul Salaam Baryali, May 2009.[2]
“The Germans are the most important enemy in the north. If they leave their base, they will find booby
traps and bombs waiting for them on every road. They will have to carry many more bodies in coffins on
their shoulders if they don't come to the realistic conclusion that their forces must withdraw from our
country.”
– Maulavi Bashir Haqqani, a Taliban military subcommander in Kunduz, May 2008.[3]
Since 2007, high level Taliban commanders have repeatedly threatened to expand their growing
insurgency into the largely passive and ethnically divided north, a sparsely populated area occupied
largely by non-combat ready ISAF units and local security forces. The Taliban’s strategy regarding the
north has been to slowly build up intelligence and support networks in the northern districts of Herat and
in the Pashtun districts of Badghis (Balamurghab and Ghormach).[4] The Taliban have deployed a
similar strategy to the northeast, creating a serious destabilization of the region since last year.
The northern provinces of Afghanistan, long described as stable, have come under increased stress
from insurgent and criminal activity. In particular, the northern province of Kunduz has borne the brunt of
the most extreme spikes in insurgent activity, including a protracted suicide and roadside bomb
campaign initiated by Taliban and foreign fighters. The Taliban’s northern offensive, orchestrated since
2007 under the leadership of the Quetta-Shura’s Mullah Shah Mansoor Dadullah[5], Mullah Berader,
and to an extent, Mullah Mohammad Omar, has recently proved successful in targeting NATO’s unity
and its mission in Afghanistan. In fact, earlier this year Mullah Berader announced the launch of
Operation Nusrat (Victory), the 2009 Taliban campaign aimed at attacking NATO and Afghan
government forces including a special decree for insurgents in Kunduz to ramp up their activities.[6] This
is a far cry from 2004 when Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) faction remained the most well
financed and capable insurgent group in the region. Allegedly, HIG leadership even established bounties
to be paid when their operatives attacked: $50,000 for a car-bombing, $10,000 for killing an IASF
soldier, $5,000 for wounding an ISAF soldier.[7]
Reasons for HIG’s influence eroding in Kunduz since 2004 are the early successes of the first national
elections and the UN’s Disarmament, Demobilize and Reintegration (DDR) initiative. The 2004 election
turnout in Kunduz was 86%, a much higher percentage than analysts predicted at that time would
turnout; even Kuchi nomads participated in the election in Kunduz.[8] Some warlords converted into
government positions, others did not and either “retired,” were dealt with militarily, or maintained mini-
fiefdoms such as the Ismaili-family in the Imam Sahib district[9]. However, it was during the return of
Afghan refugees from Pakistan in 2003-2005, some of whom were sympathetic to Mullah Omar’s
Taliban movement that the slow infiltration of Taliban sleeper-cells began.
Tactically speaking, the Taliban’s penetration and entrenchment of Kunduz over the past 18 months has
resulted in a spate of recent fatalities and casualties among US and German forces, let alone the scores
of Afghan security personnel and government officials also killed by insurgent violence. The reason
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Taliban forces are targeting Kunduz largely revolves around its pivotal location in northern Afghanistan
which is situated along several key transit routes. Kunduz contains part of the logistics route NATO
forces rely on to funnel fuel and other combat necessities from Tajikistan along what is known as the
Northern Distribution Network. “The concern is if we don't stunt the (Taliban) growth, it could cause
problems with our northern distribution network,” a senior US intelligence official, who asked not to be
further identified because he wasn't authorized to speak publicly, told reporters in August. [10] “A couple
of years ago, (Taliban leader) Mullah Omar said 'We need to open up new fronts in the north and cause
a dissipation of (U.S.) resources.' To a degree, it's working.”
Mostly calm 18-months ago, the northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan now have at least five
districts under defacto Taliban control.[11] The violence in the area prior to 2007 was largely attributed
to HIG, narcotics trafficking groups, rival warlords, intra-tribal rifts, and criminal activity, according to the
meticulously researched Kunduz Conflict Analysis report published by the Cooperation for Peace and
Unity (CPAU) organization.[12] However, the latest violence is widely attributed to the Quetta-Shura
supported Taliban fighters occupying the Charhar Darra district under the command of Mullah Abdul
Salaam Baryali, his deputy Mullah Shamsullah, and Qari Bashir Haqqani, as well as from the litany of
foreign fighters indentified by German intelligence reports as “Chechen, Arab and Uzbek fighters” (see
Appendix I). Recent evidence suggests even female militants are operating alongside the cadres of
foreign fighters.[13] There is an estimated 600-800 Taliban fighters currently engaged in insurgent
activity full-time in Kunduz with an additional 60 foreign fighters, according to German military
estimates.[14] There are approximately 400-600 Taliban fighters operating in northern Baghlan province
which borders the unstable southern districts of Kunduz.
The Taliban infiltration into the Pashtun districts around Kunduz did not occur overnight, but took months
of preparation and persistence. Influential militia commanders, former mujahedeen leaders, and
government heads were assassinated to help pave the way for the Taliban’s infiltration. Kunduz citizens
were forced to pay taxes to the Taliban infiltrators, even licit commodities such as wheat were taxed at
the farm gate, and schools, teachers and pupils alike were violently targeted by the Kunduz Taliban.[15]
Several attempts were made against the life of Engineer Mohammad Omar,[16] the long standing
governor of Kunduz since 2004, and his brother, Col. Noor Khan, who served as the Dashti-Archi
district police chief for the past few years. By August 12, Khan’s luck would run out as Taliban raiders
stormed the Dashti-Archi police headquarters, killing Khan in a hail of gunfire and rocket-propelled
grenades along with several of his bodyguards. A short while later, Mohammad Fahim Qasim, the vice
presidential running mate of Hamid Karzai, survived a complex IED-ambush on the Takhar-Kunduz
highway that left several attackers and some of Fahim’s bodyguards dead.[17] Less than a week before
the attack on Fahim, presidential candidate Mullah Salaam “Rocketi” survived a Taliban ambush in
neighboring Baghlan province. The complexity and consistency of Taliban attacks in Kunduz over the
past year highlight their level of commitment in destabilizing the northern region and their enhanced
capabilities from previous campaigns against the north.
By late 2008 and early 2009, the Taliban in Kunduz brazenly operated in broad daylight and established
sanctuaries throughout the southern districts. “Three years ago when I was appointed as the military
leader in charge for Kunduz province, we were passing our nights in ruined houses, but God thanks,
now based on Mujahidin sacrifices, we own a very good atmosphere,” Mullah Abdul Salaam Baryali, the
Taliban “shadow” Governor of Kunduz province said in an interview with the jihadist magazine Al
Samood published in May.[18] An Al Jazeera news segment filmed in June this past June lends
credence to Mullah Salaam’s claims by showing heavily armed Taliban fighters traveling in large packs
in broad day light and protecting their commander, Habibullah, who is interviewed by the news crew.
During the segment, Taliban operative “Mohammed Hashem” claimed that Taliban fighters in the
province recently perfected a $40 improvised-explosive device (IED) that can detonate against a military
vehicle “from 20-meters away.” Within a month following Hashem’s claims, two deadly IED attacks in
Kunduz left four US soldiers and three German soldiers dead.[19]
Clearly, IEDs have become an integral part of the Taliban’s northern offensive. “At the first stages of our
activities we were using remote-controlled IEDs then we started ambushes, subsequently we started
suicide attacks and nowadays we launch operations. For all these attacks we have our expert Mujahidin
ready to inflict casualties on the enemies. We are applying different tactics, but most often we use IDEs
and ambushes because these operations inflict more casualties to the enemy and less to us and also it
will not be reveal for the enemy who had attacked on them … so far we have used the suicide attacks
ten-times, the bulk of which were launched against German forces and to a lesser extent, against
domestic forces (‘mercenaries and militias’),” Mullah Salaam Baryali told the militant magazine Al
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Samood in May.[20]
Aside from IEDs, the Taliban in Kunduz have received additional funding and personnel from a small
cadre of al Qaeda-linked terrorist organizations. During the 2009 fighting season, Uzbek insurgent
groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), both
operating out of Pakistan’s FATA area and linked to the Taliban, began deploying some of their
operatives to fight and train alongside Taliban fighters in Kunduz. Scores of foreign fighters have been
killed and captured in recent Coalition, NATO and Afghan security operations in the north.
On August 28, NATO forces raided a suspected IMU hideout in the volatile Chahar Dara district. Upon
entering the compound, NATO forces received direct fire from several positions before returning fire and
killing several militants, including a female that was firing an AK-47 and wearing a combat-vest loaded
with spare ammunition magazines.[21] On September 12, a joint Afghan-NATO operation began with a
raid on a compound near the village of Torbah Kash, north-east of Kunduz city. The combined force
engaged and killed a number of foreign fighters thought to be Uzbeks and confiscated several rocket-
propelled grenades and assault rifles following the clash. Two days later, Afghanistan’s intelligence
department, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), announced the capture of two Uzbek fighters in
Kunduz, including one identified as Khalid Ahmadov, a former resident of Uzbekistan’s Ferghana
Region.[22] The pair allegedly traveled to Kunduz on direct orders from outlaw IMU commander Tohir
Yuldushev. Kunduz remains a battlefield destination for the myriad of foreign fighters held up in western
Pakistan, home to approximately 5,000 Uzbek fighters, according to a recent statement by Habibullah
Khan Khattak, an administrator from Pakistan’s tribal areas.[23]
The commander of the ISAF international security force in Afghanistan, US General Stanley McChrystal,
expressed deep concerns about the deteriorating situation in Kunduz this summer, saying the situation
warranted “closer scrutiny.” Nevertheless, the Taliban continued to operate up-tempo throughout the
summer and even managed to severely disrupt the presidential election efforts there; forcing 22 out of
the 80 polling stations in three areas (Chahar Dara, Aqtash, Khanabad) to remain closed and destroyed
several ballot boxes by burning them and throwing others into the Kunduz River.[24] Although German
forces made a concerted effort to change some of their restrictive rules of engagement earlier this year,
the German force stationed in Kunduz largely remains unfit and unable, or possibly unwilling (especially
politically) to complete its mission. To highlight German inefficiency, it is pertinent to mention when
German and Afghan forces sheepishly launched Operation Adler (Pashto for Eagle) in late July, a two-
week long “offensive” against the Taliban entrenched in the Chahar Dara district some twenty-minutes
from the German PRT-base.
Operation Adler left several Taliban killed, well over a dozen insurgents arrested, and successfully
confiscated quantities of small arms, ammunition and explosives. However, immediately following the
operation, the 600-strong Afghan National Army unit tasked with static security in Chahar Dara backed
off and withdrew up to 300 men, more than half the combat-ready force needed to secure the district.
Within hours, Taliban fighters numbering around 150 reentered the district and made their presence
known. Deputy “shadow” Governor Mullah Shamsullah quickly phoned local reporters telling them, “We
are back. Everything is going to be the same as it was earlier.”[25] His fighters could be heard shouting
“God is great!” in the background. Wahid Omar Khel, the Chahar Dara district governor, also confirmed
the Taliban’s return saying “they [Taliban] stood with weapons slung on the market squares of the
villages and seemed as happy as if they had just won a victory. They're in control of the whole of
southern Chahar Dara again.”
Simply put, Operation Adler was a tactical failure. “The last operation [Operation Adler] against the
Taliban in Chahar Dara was unsuccessful, because the soldiers were hardly prepared to stage air
strikes,” Kunduz Governor Engineer Muhammad Omar said in a media interview following Operation
Adler’s conclusion. [26] “They [Germans] are overly cautious, and they don't even get out of their
vehicles. They should leave, and the Americans should replace them. The Americans would finally
provide security.” The lack of military action over the past several years by the Kunduz-based German
IASF contingent, a 667-strong force based at the Kunduz Airbase under PRT auspices (contains less
than 325 combat ready troops), is a partial explanation for the Taliban’s success in occupying three
districts so close to Kunduz City. Unrealistic and hyper-restrictive rules-of-engagement, as well as
stifling political pressure from the German Parliament, effectively neutered German troops from any
offensive military capabilities they could implement on the battlefield.
The overall quality of the German unit serving in Afghanistan has also come under fire by NATO allies.
Over the past several years, the German contingent has been accused of being the most “physically
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unfit” NATO unit in Afghanistan and the least aggressive. Media reports indicate German forces serving
in Afghanistan consumed about 90,000 bottles of wine and 1.7 million pints of beer last year, a poor
dietary habit that has left over 40% of German soldiers overweight, compared to 35% of German
civilians of the same age who are overweight, while 8.5% of German soldiers are classified as “seriously
overweight.”[27]
NATO allies have repeatedly chastised German commanders over their inability to conduct “hunter-
killer” missions that could have a detrimental impact on improving security in the north. One such
incident, which occurred last March, had elite German KSK special-forces hunting a most-wanted
Taliban commander held responsible for the deadly suicide-bombing of a sugar-factory in Baghlan
province that killed 79 people, including dozens of children and six Members of Parliament. Upon
discovering the location of the “Baghlan bomber,” elite KSK forces spent weeks studying the habits and
routine of the Taliban fugitive. Ultimately, the German unit attempted a night raid to capture the Taliban
leader which failed, and into the night he escaped. US and British doctrine would have permitted a lethal
attack, such as laser-guided weapon being dropped on the fugitive’s compound or vehicle, but restrictive
German rules of engagement does not allow the use of lethal force unless German soldiers are under
attack. The failure to kill the Baghlan bomber brought additional tension and friction between NATO
allies and their German counterparts. “The Krauts are allowing the most dangerous people to get away
and are in the process increasing the danger for the Afghans and for all foreign forces here,” an
incredulous British officer at ISAF headquarters told Der Spiegel reporters last year.[28]
Numerous tales of Germans leaving fellow NATO forces abandoned on the battlefield are also common.
During Operation Desert Eagle in Faryab and Badghis provinces in 2007, Taliban fighters ambushed a
small Norwegian detachment alongside their ANA counterparts. The stranded unit suffered casualties
and called in German medical air-capabilities from Mazar-i-Sharif but was left on the battlefield following
Germany’s tight restrictions prohibiting their aircraft from flying past 5PM local time. One Norwegian
cavalry officer, who was engaged in the day-long fight with more than 40 Taliban near Jari Siya in
Badghis, told reporters: “It’s hopeless. We were attacking the bad guys, then [at] three or four o’clock,
the [German] helicopters are leaving. We had to go back to base. We should have had Norwegian
helicopters. At least they can fly at night.”[29]
Up until  this spring, German soldiers were forced to give three spoken commands before engaging a
threat with their rifles. A report in The Times this past July exposed the shocking caveats:
“The seven-page pocket guide to combat tucked into the breast pocket of every German soldier offers
such instructions as: “Before opening fire you are expected to declare loudly, in English, ‘United Nations
— stop, or I will fire,” followed by a version in Pashtu — Melgaero Mellatuna- Dreesch, ka ne se dasee
kawum!” The alert must also be issued in Dari, and the booklet, devised by a committee in some
faraway ministerial office, adds: “If the situation allows, the warning should be repeated.” The joke going
round NATO mess tents poses the question: ‘How can you identify a German soldier? He is the corpse
clutching a pocket guide.’”[30]
By early September, whether they were trying to shed their reputation of being weak-kneed or acting in
concert to a looming crisis, the German PRT commander Colonel George Klein would order an airstrike
that will forever change the German mission in Afghanistan and adversely affect the security situation in
Kunduz for months, if not years to come.
Sometime on September 3, a band of Taliban fighters and foreign militants attacked an Afghan fuel
convoy as it traveled south from Tajikistan and into the Ali Abad district of Kunduz province, a NATO
logistics route known as the Nothern Distribution Network. Local accounts describe the brutality of the
“Chechen” fighters among the insurgent hijacking squad who allegedly executed two of the Afghan truck
drivers by sawing off their heads, a common battlefield tactic among foreign fighters in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan and Chechnya.[31] The Taliban fighters hijacked the two fuel trucks filled with gasoline roughly
fifteen-kilometers from Kunduz City, a short distance southwest of the Kunduz Airbase where the 667
strong German PRT is located.
After a fierce summer season of intense violence in Kunduz province, including several high profile
assassination attempts and bridgehead explosions near Kunduz City, the Taliban ran into difficulty
transporting the weighed down fuel tankers over the muddy banks of the Kunduz River near Omar Kheil,
a small hamlet located between the Taliban controlled districts of Chahar Dara and Ali Abad. As the
trucks bogged down in the mud on a small “island” in the middle of the Kunduz River, the Taliban and
Chechen hijackers encouraged locals to siphon off some of the fuel to help lighten the load so the trucks
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could be extracted from the muddy grave. Around this time, German forces requested help from an
American B1-B to locate the trucks. By the time the bomber located the bogged down trucks (10
minutes after arrival), the aircraft made preparations to refuel and left the scene. Notating how close the
hijacked fuel trucks were to the German PRT, additional aircraft was requested by Colonel George Klein
and within twenty minutes two American F-15Es arrived on station.
Within the early hours of September 4th, the American F-15E’s dropped a pair of 500lb. bombs on the
hijacked fuel trucks as they remain stuck in the mud near the villages of Omar Kheil and Yaqoubi. What
happened next would catapult Germany’s presence in Afghanistan and the growing insecurity of
northern Afghanistan into the spotlight. The incident drew a near instantaneous negative response from
the US commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McCrystal, severely damaging
US and German relations and prompting German government officials to being speaking about “exit
plans” for their forces to withdraw from Afghanistan.[32]
The bombing of the fuel trucks spawned local reports describing the horrific scene carnage, with high
civilian casualties and fatalities being among the first details. Little credence was given to the fact that
the bombing took place at 2:30 AM local time in a Taliban controlled district in Kunduz or how exactly,
did heavily armed Taliban and feared “Chechen” fighters wrangle up nearly 100 villagers in the dead of
night to siphon gasoline out of trucks bogged down in the Kunduz River. The incident prompted a visit by
General McCrystal to the blast site and to a local hospital where many civilians injured in the blast were
being treated shortly after the incident.
Local residents soon drafted a list of those missing, or those thought to have perished in the attack,
something local Taliban officials also made available in a spectacular propaganda coup (see Appendix
II). German officials maintained the threat of two hijacked fuel trucks represented too high of a security
threat not to take immediate action, a notion that the Kunduz Governor also agreed with. German
intelligence officers believed the hijacked fuel trucks were going to be used as large-vehicle-borne-
improvised-explosive devices (LVBIEDs) against the German PRT base, a short drive from where the
tankers were blown in place. Aerial surveillance feed and single source reporting guided Col. Klein’s
decision and he ordered the US strike jets to bomb the fuel trucks, obliterating the sunken vehicles,
dozens of insurgents and scores of civilians. A recently completed NATO investigation into the bombing
concludes that nearly 70 militants were killed in the blast, with an additional 30 civilians also killed; a
similar conclusion was reached by a separate investigation conducted by the Afghan government.[33]
The Taliban claim NATO used white phosphorus bombs on the fuel tankers, blanketing the area in a
wall of flame that explains why now bomb crater was present at the scene of the strike and also why
both tankers were not completely blown apart upon impact.[34] At the time of this writing, little attention
has been paid by the media into the Taliban’s claims, although it does not explain the presence of
plastic fuel jugs located near the blast site in some of the photos, which obviously would have melted
during the fire and white phosphorus (See Appendix III).
Nevertheless, the body count remains insignificant in light of the incident’s framing by both the
international media and Taliban propaganda activities. The hamlets surrounding the blast site will
inevitably become hardened bastions of the Kunduz Taliban movement, signs of which have already
surfaced as armed Taliban “guard” the village from foreign influence and the Taliban’s capture of a New
York Times journalist and his “fixer” in Omar Kheil days after the air strike occurred. The continued
presence of Taliban fighters and their influence over the local population (convincing them to siphon fuel
at 2:30 AM and paying them $750 to plant IEDs[35], providing food and water to fighters, etc.) in
Kunduz is troubling, and security and stability in the northern provinces will certainly remain elusive as
long as NATO forces continue to maintain the status quo of limited interaction with local communities
and blunderous battlefield decisions. Recent media reports from the region imply the instability caused
by the Taliban in Kunduz is having an adverse affect on the security situation in Tajikistan, an adhoc
domino-effect that could eventually threaten regional security at a level unseen since the late 1990’s.
“The escalation of fighting in Kunduz and other Afghan provinces (bordering Tajikistan) may make the
situation at the border more tense and provoke the Taliban to break through,” Tajikistan’s Deputy
Defense Minister Ramil Nadyrov told reporters.[36]
If NATO continues to allow Taliban and insurgent activity to thrive in areas north of Baghlan, the Taliban
will likely begin to coordinate with regional warlords, narco-traffickers and Taliban sympathizers to help
push their violent agenda to areas further west, including into Samangan and Balkh provinces. Taliban
activity already underway further west in Badghis and Faryab provinces threaten to complete the
Taliban’s two-pronged approach into the north, including their ambitious aims to eventually stage large
scale attacks in the largest city in northern Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif. Additionally, if NATO does not
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address the strategic linkages between Afghan insurgents and Pakistani militant groups, this will allow
for other “far flung” regions of Afghanistan, including those currently deemed “stable,” to be the next
target of the Afghan insurgency whose leadership continues to operate unhindered from their sanctuary
in southwestern Pakistan (Baluchistan). The instability in Kunduz serves as the perfect example of this
nexus. “The anti-government resistance in Kunduz is controlled from Pakistan,” Kunduz Governor
Engineer Omar said recently.[37] “At first, only a few local residents supported the movement, but in the
run-up to the election, Pakistan's intelligence service has activated its sources in Kunduz. What kind of
a response do the Germans have to that?” Precisely, if the German contingent cannot even control a
district that is 15-minutes from their PRT base, there is no chance of them stopping or disrupting the
pipeline of insurgents, explosives, and doctrine flowing over the border and into northern Afghanistan.
The stability and security situation in Kunduz is certainly grim, and in light of the recent air strike
scandal, the political situation is increasingly bad. Without an immediate change of course, Kunduz could
eventually become the northern capital for the defacto Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Appendix I[38]
Kunduz Province- Personalities
Engineer Mohammad Omar: Kunduz Governor; Several media reports accuse Engineer Omar
of being highly corrupt and that he routinely passes sensitive information to known Taliban fighters
working in the province. The reports further speculate that Omar is also linked to the drug trade citing
same sources. These reports are largely unsubstantiated however. German officials are lobbying for his
removal and have gained support from the current Interior Minister Mohammad Atmar. Omar has been
Kunduz governor since March 2004. Association: Hizb-i Tanzim Dawat-i Islami-I Afghanistan (Sayyaf).
Mahbobullah Syedi: the spokesperson of provincial governor.
General Abdul Razaq: Former Kunduz police chief?   Brigadier-General Razaq is a Tajik from Paghman
district in Kabul, and is a former officer in the Communist forces. 
Col. (identified as Brigadier General last year) Abdul Rahman Aaqtash (Haqtash): deputy provincial
police chief.
Col. Noor Khan: The brother of Mohammad Omar and district police chief for Dashti Archi. Survived an
ambush on May 20th in the Wazir Khan village area. One police escort was wounded and a police truck
destroyed. The counterattack allegedly left two attackers dead while the Taliban claim to have killed 8
policemen in the clash. He was killed August 12 after Taliban forces raided the Dashti-Archi district
headquarters.
Sheikh Saduddin- Dashti-Archi district governor.
Abdul Majid Azimi : NDS provincial chief for Kunduz and works closely with the German military
contingent. 
Maulavi Abdullah: Provincial council chief of Kunduz.
Preme Qull: Uzbek, former mujahedeen commander with a “ruthless reputation” who fought the Taliban
during the 1990’s and is now a Member of Parliament. He lives in a massive compound in Kunduz and
is protected by soldiers. He told reporters in August: “We all know that opposition to this government is
all over Afghanistan. It is not simply the old Taliban, but also former mujahedeen who have switched
sides and decided to fight the government. Our old mujahedeen fighters found themselves without jobs
or influence. They are fighting with the Taliban now.”
Dr. Humayun Khamoosh: Head of Kunduz Central Hospital.
Abdul Wahid Omarkhil (Abdul Wahid Omarkhel): Current district chief of Chahar Darreh district, an
area 15 km northeast of Kunduz City plagued by Taliban activity.
Malim Nazir: Former administrative head of Charhar Darreh district (July 2008). 
Lt. Col. Baryali: Chahar Darreh district police chief.
Malim Juma Din: Current district chief form Imam Sahib district.
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Mohammad Najeb Jamil: The director of Oil and Gas Department of Shir Khan port bordering
Tajikistan, who was killed near Kunduz city around June 18. Jamil was asked to pay the Taliban before
his death. Since his assassination, his replacement has been asked to fund the Taliban as well.  
Mehmoodul Hassan: Deputy investigative officer of Takhar; nearly assassinated in Kunduz on June 10.
Taliban claimed credit for the attack.
Qaiz Azimy and Hamdedullah Shah: Two al Jazeera producers arrested by NDS after meeting and
filming Taliban fighters and their leader in Kunduz in mid-June. The pair was later released after 3 days
of questioning.
Taliban and Insurgents
Habibullah: Young Taliban commander in Kunduz interviewed by
al Jazeera in June 2009. During the interview, Habibullah claimed
to have 12 suicide bombers at the ready for attacks across the
province. One of fighters (Mohammed Hamesh---see below)
claims to have constructed a new IED that “explodes when a tank
gets within 20 meters of it. It only costs $40 dollars to make.”
Taliban check-points have been established a few kilometers
north of the city. Photo (above) shows Habibullah during a spring
2009 interview with Al Jazeera.
Khalid Salim: One of ten most wanted Taliban and insurgent leaders operating in Kunduz. He operates
in the Aqtash area and may run the “task force” in charge of attacking schools in Kunduz. He refers to
Kunduz as the Islamic Emirate of Northern Afghanistan.
Abdul Razzeq: Taliban commander in Badakhshan responsible for several high profile attacks and
IEDs. He was apprehended recently during a KSK commando raid on the outskirts of Faizabad and
flown directly to Kabul. He was one the 10 most wanted list for RC-North. He was the Mullah of  the
Tirgaran maddrassah in upper Badakhshan district of Warduj. 
Mullah Salam (Shaykh Mulla Abdulsalam [Biryali]): Salam
is the son of Muhammad Sarwar Bin Mulla Muhammad Khan,
and is 35 years old. His family(Pashtun, Tokhi tribe) is known
for their religious and educational background and they
originally hail from the Dasht-e Archi District of Kunduz
province. Salam is currently number one on ISAF’s 10-most
wanted list for Kunduz. He takes direct orders from the Quetta
Shura, in particular, from Mullah Berader. To avoid being
tracked he rarely makes calls and he travels in various
disguises. “Even in Kunduz, he never sleeps in the same
house for two nights in a row.” Following the arrest of Abdul
Razzeq and several offensives launched by German soldiers
in the spring of 2009, Salam is believed to have fled for Kandahar. He is responsible for facilitating and
orchestrating nearly every attack directed against German troops in Kunduz. He has vowed to continue
his attacks until  all  Germans and foreign invaders are ousted from Kunduz. Photo shows Salam being
interviewed by Al-Sumud, a militant magazine from Afghanistan published in Arabic .
Mohammad Hashem: Taliban fighter based in Kunduz operating
alongside commander Habibullah. Both Hashem and Habibullah
appeared in a controversial al Jazeera news segment in the spring of
2009. Afghan intelligence officials arrested the three al Jazeera
producers responsible for the segment shortly after they met with
Taliban fighters outside of Kunduz City and held them for 3 days. 
Hashem claims the Taliban have deployed ‘new IEDs’ capable of
destroying NATO vehicles at the cost of $40 a bomb. Shortly after his
interview, two separate roadside bombs in Kunduz left 3 Germans and
4 US soldiers dead. Photo (left) is taken from the al Jazeera news
segment.
Mullah Shamsullah: Deputy to Mullah Salam, Mullah Shamsullah is still active and physically present in
Kunduz. He is the overall commander for the Chahar Darreh district , the most unstable district in
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Kunduz now that Mullah Salam is allegedly on the run. He claims to switch his location everyday and
stays in a variety of different houses. He allegedly always has two bodyguards with him.
Shaikh Abdul: Lead Taliban leader in Kunduz and the target of a combined operation in the Gul Tiapa
area on June 16. He was reportedly killed by German and Afghan soldiers along with four of his men.
Mufti Selim: Uzbek commander for Uzbek nationals fighting in Kunduz. He is tightly linked with Kunduz
Taliban commander Mawlawi Abdul Rahman. “This war shows the hypocrisy of the world,” Mufti Selim
told reporters in August. “During the Russian jihad everyone gave weapons to us, now they are all
against us.” He spoke in a very eloquent classical Arabic that he said had learned in madrasas in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.[39]
Mawlawi Abdul Rahman: A younger Taliban leader for Kunduz and member of the Qomissyon, or
Committee. He is allied with a Turkomen insurgent commander and the Uzbek commander for Kunduz,
Mufti Selim.[40]
Qari Abdul Wadoud- He is the senior Taliban commander in the Imam Sahib district of northern
Kunduz. He is suspected of commanding up to 100 insurgent fighters. "German troops with the
cooperation of national security forces arrested Taliban key commander Qari Abdul Wadoud from
Qarakator village of Imam Sahib district Friday," Juma Khan, the governor of Imam Sahib, told Xinhua
on August 1, 2009.
Mullah Khairullah: Suspected Taliban suicide bomb and IED facilitator for Kunduz (Chara darah
district). Police authorities allegedly arrested Khairullah and several of his men (‘trained’ suicide
bombers) on July 9, 2008.The Taliban denied being linked to a Kunduz insurgent commander by this
name.
Maulavi Ahmad: Identified himself as the Taliban’s “shadow” governor for Kunduz during a media
interview published on September 7.[41] He claims to have over 700 fighters under his command.
There is reason to suspect the interview was fake, since Mullah Abdul Salaam has been verified as the
Taliban’s shadow governor for Kunduz. One interesting note is Kunduz Governor Engineer Omar has
claimed Mullah Abdul Salaam was killed in an Afghan security operation in September, an incident that
occurred before Maulavi Ahmad’s declaration of his shadow governor position. However, a man claiming
to be Abdul Salaam phoned reporters following Omar’s claim of his death, vowing to continue his
attacks against the government.
Qari Sidiqullah: Designated Taliban district chief for Imam Sahib District. He was reportedly killed
alongside a companion in the area around May 30-31 during a security operation.
Mullah Bashir (Qari Bashir Haqqani): (Information likely
inconsistent, possibly falsified or mixed identities) Top Taliban
leader operating in northeastern Afghanistan including Baghlan and
Kunduz. Serves as a semi-official spokesman for the north and has
issued several threats against the German government and its military
forces in the north. He is a subcommander of Mullah Abdul Salaam.
He made headlines in the summer of 2007 when he was granted
temporary amnesty to conduct negotiations in Ghazni over the fate
the 21 abducted South Korean hostages. Photo (left) shows Bashir in
August 2007 as he and Mullah Nasrullah engaged in negotiations with
the South Korean and Afghan governments over the fate of the 21 SK
hostages seized in a Taliban ambush.
RC-North Taliban personalities
Mullah Usman: Former top Taliban leader in northeastern Afghansitan (Badakshan, Takhar, Kunduz).
He was killed during a police operation along with several insurgents and police after the militant group
attaked a security check post in Takhar’s Kalafan district on July 26-27, 2008.
Shaykh Mawlawi Muhammad Hasan Hashimi:
Taliban commander in Takhar. He is the son of
Muhammad Hashim, who was born “in a famous well-
educated and jihadist family in the village of Ardishan in
Farkhar Subdistrict in the Takhar Province 38 years
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
https://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=34[10/6/2011 10:29:53 AM]
ago.” He is a top commander in Takhar. Photo (left)
allegedly shows Hashimi during an interview with Al-
Sumud Magazine, a militant magazine from Afghanistan
published in Arabic)
ANP: Local units are notoriously corrupt. Many are
sympathetic to the Taliban and/or actively participate in
the narcotics industry, most likely providing protection
for drug convoys and money laundering.
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) – Two IJU operatives were arrested in Kunduz on May 12. The lead
individual was described as a “known IJU militant” while the second person arrested was described as
an associate. The IJU is a Turkish based militant group with strong ties to the Haqqani Network, who are
active in western Pakistan (North Waziristan) and RC-East (Khost/Paktia/Paktika/Logar/Ghazni/Kabul).
The IMU, which the IJU initially splintered from, is believed to be responsible for the trafficking of nearly
70 percent of all heroin trafficked through Central Asia and are also active in Badghis province.
Locations
Chahar Darreh district: 15km southwest of Kunduz city where the German contingent in based. Aqtash
is completely overrun by Taliban. Locals refer to them as “the only government functioning here.” Qosh
Tappeh, a village also close to Kunduz, has resisted Taliban infiltration by countering their threats from
former Mujahedeen commanders who now support the government and work at the schools. This is
also the area where a June 8th ambush left two German soldiers shot and injured as well as the late
June attack that killed three German troops when their armored personnel carrier crashed into a ditch
and they drowned following a Taliban ambush.
Qasabha village (Chahar Darah district): The area where 2 German soldiers would injured during an
IED on their vehicle on June 8.
Dobandi (Charhar Darah district): The scene of a suicide bombing attack against a German convoy
that left three school children (female) wounded on July 6, 2008. This was the third suicide bombing in
Kunduz in 2008. The blast destroyed a German vehicle and a roadside electrical transmission pole,
severing electricity to most of the district.
Imam Sahib district: Area in northern Kunduz that had an appointed Taliban district administrator. It is
also a known smuggling transit route. Police confiscated over 1,000 bottles of alcohol here (smuggled in
from Tajikistan) in July 2008.
Sharawan (Imam Sahib district): Shah Rawan is the name of a canal carrying water from the river in
Taloqan to water the large plain of Dashti Archi (dasht means plain / steppe); along that canal Pashtun
settler were brought in since the 1930s. It is also near a village in Imam Sahib district that saw a fierce
clash between police and Taliban on May 30 which left 3 insurgents dead and their motorcycle, RPG
and machine gun confiscated.
Gunbad (Imam Sahib district): Area where the Taliban claim to be active in.
Hasqalan- Is the area near Kunduz City where four engineers were injured in a roadside bombing on
June 18.
Aqtash village (Khanabad district): Northeast of Kunduz city, Aqtash is an insurgent stronghold.
Taliban fighters are muscling in and shutting schools down in and near the village
Durahi Archi district: Durahi means road fork; it’s the junction on the road where the road to Archi
goes off the main tarmac road . This is the area where Mohammad Najeb Jamil, director of Oil and Gas
Department, was shot dead by Taliban assassins on June 17.
Wazir Khan village (Durahi Archi district): Scene of late night ambush that nearly killed district police
chief (and brother to the governor) Col. Noor Khan on May 20.
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Gul Tiapa: Located northwest of Kunduz City, GT was the area where German 
and Afghan soldiers killed Sheikh Abdul and his four men on June 16. Previously, insurgents blew a
critical bridgehead in GT on August 17, 2008. The blast severed the connection between several
villages on Kunduz City.
Angor Bagh (area of Kunduz City): Location of June 10 attack that nearly killed Deputy investigative
officer of Takhar Mehmoodul Hassan.
Kabul Bandar (Bandar means “port of entry”): Scene of the September 23rd, 2008 suicide car
bombing that rammed a German convoy and injured several people.
Aliabad and Chardara district corridor: Area where a German convoy was struck by an IED on
August 27, 2008. Chardara was rocked by two suicide attacks and three IEDS between Jan. 1 and
August 27, 2008.
Appendix II[42]
Taliban Statement Regarding the September 4 Air Strike in Kunduz
Findings of the Investigation Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Gruesome Event
of Kunduz and Names of Victims Ramadan 18, 1430 A.H, September 9, 2009
In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
As reported in the media, Kunduz a northern province of Afghanistan, borne the brunt of a horrendous
event. Jet fighters of foreign invaders on Friday night bombed a congestion of people who had gathered
to take fuel from tankers left by the enemy. More than one hundred persons from various villages of
Char Dara and Ali Abad districts were killed as a result. People who witnessed the place of the event
and some media reporters who visited the scene say all the victims are civilians but NATO and Kabul
regime’s spokesmen and other authorities brazenly claim the victims are armed Taliban.
On the following day of this horrific event, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan constituted an investigation
team to find facts about the event and submit them in the shape of a separate report. The aim was to
present facts before our country men and the people of the world for their judgment. This report has
been prepared under the sole moral, religious and patriotic Afghan obligation. It is neither a politically
motivated report nor a propaganda-oriented. The facts contained in the report are solely those told by
local people and the victims relatives. Therefore, it is a credible report of the event.
1. How the Event Occurred: Mujahideen ambushed fuel tanker on high way in Ali Abad district on
Thursday September 3, 2009. The fuel tankers were carrying fuel for military vehicles from central Asian
countries. Mujahideen usually carry out such attacks but this time the NATO forces left two fuel tankers
intact in the scene of fighting. Mujahideen tried to drive the tankers to Char Dara district but one fuel
tanker trapped in mud in a river between Ali Abad and Char Dara district,. The Mujahideen tried to
empty the fuel of the tanker.
However, witnessing the tankers, the local people of the surrounding villages who were still awake
because of Ramadan, approached the Mujahideen and requested them to allow them to take the
gushing fuel home. Mujahideen allowed them to take the fuel but upon seeing the enemy
reconnaissance planes in the air, Mujahideen told people to stop taking the fuel. But now the gathering
of the people had reached hundreds of persons. Every one wanted to take the fuel home. Mujahideen
could not prevent all the people from taking the fuel. However, they stopped some of them but many
others came once again to take fuel. The Mujahideen who were present on the site say, we tried hard to
tell people to go home but could not force them to do so. Exactly, at 1:45 AM in the night, jet fighters
bombed the fuel tankers.
2. All the Victims are Civilians: At the time of the bombardment, some Mujahideen and local people had
left the site but still there were people on the site. Residents of Haji Abdur Rahman village of Ali Abad
district, Haji Essa khan village, Haji Aman village, Haji Rustam village, and Yaqub bai village, Essa khel
of Char Dara district and of other villages say the victims are their sons and brothers and are common
villagers. Many of them are miserable youth and students. The people categorically rejected statements
by spokesmen of USA, the Kabul regime and some other vested-interest circles who claim the victims
were armed Mujahideen. Similarly, tens of the injured are villagers as well.
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3. White Phosphorus were used in the Attack: Contrarily to the claims that the victims have been burnt
up in the flames of the fuels of the tankers or as a result of bomb explosions, in fact, the victims have
been burnt in the flames of the bombs and other explosives. The witness says they saw flaming fire from
the jets descending to the ground which in two cases scorched a ground of 100 square meters. They
say the tankers were not hit directly from the planes but the fuel tankers caught fire from the flames of
the bombs thrown from the jet fighters. The ground has been baked with flames.
There is no cavity or crater to show the impact of the bombs strike. The victims say a bad smelling
matter glued to their bodies which they felt to be burning all their flesh down to bones. A father of two
sons, who died after the air raid, said his sons had lost mental balance before dying. These are the
same symptoms seen in victims of Bala Blok, Farah province. Later, doctors in Bala Blok said the
symptoms of the victims were the result of the use of white phosphorus.
This unfolds veil from an unforgivable crime. The white phosphorus is a poisonous matter which is
banned to be used according to all laws governing wars. But the invaders are brazenly using them.
Ironically, the United Nations and other human rights advocacy entities have remained deaf and blind
about this serious issue. The Kabul government was not allowing the victims to be taken to Kabul for the
treatment. It is clear that they did not want the world to know about the use of the white phosphorous in
Kunduz.
The exact number of the victims is still unknown because the victims of this horrendous event are hailing
from villages sparsely situated in the area. To collect information about the exact number of those killed
in the air raid will take time. Many of the corpses were burnt to ashes while others burnt beyond
recognition.
Some dead bodies were carried away by water of the river. Some injured persons have been taken to
hospitals. There are families who still do not know whether their members are martyred or injured or not.
The local people and eye-witness estimate that up to 120 people may have died in the bloody event but
the exact number of the victims could not be confirmed.
The following is the list of the victims along with their names and identity who have been buried up by
their families. However, this is in no way the final account of the victims.
No. Name Father’s Name Village Age Job
1 A. Rahim Haji Bashir H.A. Rahman 34 Driver
2 Ibrahim Haji Bashir H.A. Rahma 20 farmer
3 Sami ullah Haji Bashir H.A. Rahman 17 Student
4 Zakir ullah Abdul Dayan H.A. Rahman 13 Student
5 Ahmad Gul Gul Raiz H.A. Rahman 15 Student
6 Muhammada
Gul
Gul Raiz H.A. Rahman 13 Student
7 Mullah Noor Abdul Raof H.A. Rahman 16 Student
8 Arif khan Abdul Rahman H.A. Rahman 12 Student
9 Abdul Dayan Abdul Hanan H.A. Rahman 14 Student
10 Abdul Samad Abdul Hanan H.A. Rahman 11 Student
11 Mohammad
Sadiq
Gulo Bai H.A. Rahman 35 farmer
12 Momin Aziz khan H.A. Rahman 22 Driver
13 Abdul Hameed Abdulallah Khan H.A. Rahman 34 farmer
14 Qudrat ullah Aman ullah H.A. Rahman 40 Shopkeeper
15 Abdul Ghoyor Sahar Gul H.A. Rahman 25 Labor
16 Najmudin Gulanudin H.A. Rahman 35 farmer
17 Muhammad
Wali
Tor Char Dara migrant 35 farmer
18 Ayaz Muhammad Wali Char Dara migrant 8 Student
19 Gul Douz Ajab khan Char Dara migrant 50 farmer
20 Muhammad Gul Douz Char Dara migrant 14 Student
21 Hakamudin Haji Musa Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
31 Driver
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22 Allah Noor Haji Musa Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
25 farmer
23 Gul Din Haji Musa Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
27 Shopkeeper
24 Ahmad Noor Laludin Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
15 farmer
25 Abdul Khaliq Suliman Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
24 Labor
26 Hasan Muhammad Omer Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
60 Wrestler










Abdullah Jan Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
25 farmer
30 Nadar khan Akhtar Muhammad Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
15 farmer
31 Arif Nadar khan Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
15 farmer
32 Alaf din Akhtar Muhammad Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
16 farmer
33 Daoud Ibrahim Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
15 Student
34 Aman ullah Abdul Salam Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
30 farmer
35 Qodrat ullah Abdul Dayan Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
20 farmer
36 Khodai dad Abdul Wahab Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
19 farmer





Juma bai Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
20 Driver
39 Noor ullah Juma bai Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
9 Student
40 Salam Abdul Wadoud Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
14 Student
41 Alaf din Haji Gul din Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
25 farmer
42 Wazir Haji Gul din Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
22 Driver
43 Bashir Haji Gul Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
17 farmer
44 Zikrullah Alaf udin Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
12 Student
45 Ajmal Abdul Hanan Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
15 Student
46 Muhammad Ali Noor Muhammad Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar Dara
35 Driver
47 Rahmat ullah Muhammad Ali Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
14 Student





Haji Jalat Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
33 Mill owner
50 Juma Gul Haji Jalat Yaqob bai village, District 27 farmer
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
https://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=34[10/6/2011 10:29:53 AM]
Char Dar
51 Asad ullah Haji Jalat Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
22 Shopkeeper
52 Aman ulllah Feroz Yaqob bai village, District
Char Dar
16 Shopkeeper
53 Hafeez ullah Haji Nor ahmad Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
28 Boat worker
54 Masjidi Mir Rahman Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
24 farmer
55 Sahamsudin Mir Rahman Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
17 Student
56 Ihsan ullah Saed Muhammad Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
19 Labor
57 Nasrat ullah Muhammad ulllah Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
25 farmer





Juma khan Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
45 Labor
60 Abdul Rahim Mir Akbar Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
17 Student





Jan Muhammad Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
18 Shopkeeper
63 Ahmad Shah Muhammad Dauod Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
10 Student







Ghaeb ullah Haji Amanullah village,
District Char Dara
33 farmer
66 Abdul qayom Haji Mida Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
26 farmer
67 Ali Muhammad Jan Muhammad Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
30 farmer
68 Ahmad din Saed Aleem Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
14 Student
69 Noor Alam Salamat khan Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
25 Shopkeeper
70 Saed Rahim Samandar Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
28 farmer
71 Aziz ullah Saed Ahmad din Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
24 farmer
72 Bashir Ahmad Ghami Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
32 farmer
73 Abdul Rahim Ghulam Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
22 farmer
74 Amir Gul Karim Essa khel village, District
Char Dara
30  
75 Shah Wali Mullah Akhtar Haji Rustum village, District
Char Dara
40  
76 Juma khan Haji Shalo Haji Rustum village, District
Char Dara
35 Driver
77 Ajab khan Haji Shalo Haji Rustum village, District
Char Dara
32 Shopkeeper
78 Ikram udin Adam khan Haji Rustum village, District
Char Dara
21 Labor
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The above report substantiates that a most deplorable act of crime and atrocity has taken place in
Kunduz province in which Afghan civilians have been targeted. The Charter of the United Nation,
principles of the Amnesty International and the Geneva Conventions clearly oppose such crimes. If the
United Nation, the Amnesty International and other human rights entities, the Islamic Conference and
finally the so-called civilized world respect the value of the blood of a human being, their sincerity and
commitment will be put to test following this horrendous event.
If the judges sitting in the Hague tribunal do not summon the perpetrators of this event to question them,
or at least do not show reaction in the shape of condemnation against this event, then what face will they
have to raise the voice of prosecuting perpetrators of crimes of humanity.
Ostensibly, they issue summons time and again to bring to book those who are involved in crimes of
humanity. The event in Kunduz will prove that whether the world entities of human rights are sincerely
working for the protections of human rights or they only raise empty slogans.
To end, we express our sympathy with the people of Kunduz for this atrocious event and suffice to
remind them of the following divine message in order to deliver them from the violence of colonialism
“Do not think Allah is unaware of the deed the wrongdoers do but He only postpones it until  the Day
when their eyes will be blurred. (True is the Word of Allah)
Toward an independent Islamic system in the country.
Fact-find Commission on Kunduz Event Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Appendix III
Photos of Ali Abad/Chahar Dara Air Strike, September 4, 2009
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